I. Introduction
The place of the individual in the international legal order is a controversial and complex issue. The debates around the position international law adopts, or should adopt, regarding the individual have taken many shapes and forms over the years. It is true that most steps that have been taken towards the inclusion of the individual in the international legal order can be traced in treaty law. It is equally true that there has not been a consistent stance of international law towards the identification of a place for the individual. The individual may be seen -and is primarily seen -as a beneficiary of international law since he or she is accorded protection (either directly or indirectly) through a number of instruments. They may also been seen -more recently -as users of international law. In broad terms, the former term denotes an individual being granted a 'mere benefit' by international law, in particular by means of an international treaty, while the latter signifies the creation of a 'substantive (legally enforceable) right'.
1 Whether in the future the individual will also be treated as a participant, ie as an actor rather than a recipient of benefits or substantive rights, remains to be seen. Before going into the substance of these terms, and of the role of the individual in the law of treaties, a few preliminary steps are required in order to delineate the topic.
First, this chapter will only deal with individuals and not with groups of individuals (eg NGOs or rebel groups) or corporate actors. 2 The analysis will be focused on the individual person, and on their relationship with and position in the law of treaties.
Second, the chapter will not confine itself to an analysis of the position of the individual strictly within the law of treaties, solely looking at what the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 3 has to say on the topic. It will also incorporate an analysis of the position of the individual within a number of special treaty regimes.
The following section of this chapter (II) addresses the discussion in international law on subjects and international legal personality. It demonstrates that while an appraisal of this discussion is essential in order to proceed to the analysis of the position of the individual in the law of treaties, there is nothing that prevents a study of the position of the individual in a manner that is detached from the debate on the doctrine of subjects. The next section (III) is devoted to determining the position of the individual according to the law of treaties stricto sensu (ie the VCLT and relevant customary law). There is little -if any -material on the topic. However, the doctrine of subjects of international law is informed by the practice adopted -among other things -in specific international treaties and special treaty regimes, which are discussed in subsequent sections. Moreover, the doctrine of subjects forms the starting point for any discussion of the individual. 4 At the same time it provides for a conceptual basis for the analysis that follows. So the issue of subjects will be discussed at the outset, in order to provide the necessary background, and will then be taken up at the end of this chapter as a possible topic for further research. a research agenda for the future, focusing on the individual as a participant in treaties, on the relationship between the place of the individual in the law of treaties on the one hand and the individual within treaties on the other, and on the bearing that the developments regarding the position of the individual with respect to treaties may have on the doctrine of subjects and legal personality.
II. Subjecthood, Legal Personality, and the Legal 'Capacity' of Individuals
All law regulates human behaviour, and international law is no exception.
5
Individuals are at the epicenter of international law as they are at the epicenter of municipal law. This may be harder to witness in international law than it is in municipal law; yet, a closer look reveals that during the twentieth century many international treaties have been concluded with an eye on the individual. The rise of human rights treaties is an obvious example. Even before the rise of human rights, however, international humanitarian law gave special attention to the individual. 6 International environmental law was also initially geared towards the individual, albeit in a broad manner and not in the sense of according it rights or imposing on it duties. 7 International economic law has offered numerous examples of a special focus on the individual as well. 8 In all these canonical areas of international law we find 5 H Kelsen, 'Théorie Générale du Droit International Public, Problèmes Choisis ' (1932) 42 RCADI 117, [145] [146] Early humanitarian treaties did not confer any rights on the individual but they had provisions that sought to protect her, see for instance Hague Convention IV Respecting the laws and Customs of War It was the PCIJ that also made clear the distinction between benefitting the individual by bestowing rights upon it, and enabling it to have recourse to a procedure (judicial or otherwise) in order to enforce these rights. It observed that 'it is scarcely necessary to point out that the capacity to possess civil rights does not necessarily imply the capacity to exercise those rights oneself'.
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The literature on the position of individuals in international law takes usually -if not always -as its starting point the doctrine of subjects. 15 This can be easily explained.
Before discussing the individual in public international law, one must first position the individual within the system. States are the paradigmatic subjects of international law. Any other entity, including individuals, is not self-evidently a subject of that law.
The idea that the individual is a subject of international law is certainly not novel. In one sense, it formed a reaction by part of the literature to the hardcore positivist views on international law of the early 20th century. Anzilotti was vehemently opposed to any idea that the individual could be a subject of international law. uniform definition of the concept of subjecthood and no clear picture of its relationship with the (cognate) concept of international legal personality. According to the prevailing view, the terms 'subject' and 'international legal personality' denote the same thing and may be used interchangeably. 20 There is also the view that subjects of international law are actors that possess all attributes of legal personality (ie they can bear obligations and enjoy rights, they can pursue these rights internationally in their own name, they can be held responsible for breaches of their obligations, and they can participate in law making).
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Regardless of the correct view on the definition of these concepts, a third concept may be used to connect those of subjects and international legal personality: the concept of 'capacity'. Capacity is a concept that may be employed to give content to the concepts of both subjecthood and international legal personality. To sum up, the point of departure for this chapter is that individuals may have different capacities to act in various circumstances and under various international legal regimes (or canonical areas). The analysis that follows looks at the capacities individuals have been endowed with by means of international treaties. In this way, a differentiation between the individual as a beneficiary or duty bearer, the individual as a user, and the individual as a potential participant will be reflected more accurately.
III. Capacity of Individuals under the General Law of Treaties
The customary law of treaties, as reflected in part in the Vienna Convention on the provision of Article 60(5) seems to elevate them to quasi-third parties, 34 in the sense that treaties of a humanitarian character bestow on individuals something akin to 'acquired rights', ie rights that cannot be retracted as a response to a serious breach of the treaty by another State. This can be coupled with the protection offered by Article 60(1)- (3), which makes it very difficult for States to terminate or withdraw on account of breach from treaties which are not meant to be operating in 'bilateral constellations' -ie primarily treaties which involve human rights 'pledges', rights pledged to those within the jurisdiction of the State assuming the relevant obligations.
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States are then free, under the law of treaties, to accord individuals whatever legal capacity they wish to, by means of treaties between them, even if they are less free to retract rights or benefits already bestowed. 36 Depending on the capacity that such treaty regimes accord to individuals, the latter may be qualified as mere 'beneficiaries', as actual 'users', and perhaps even as 'participants': not only of the specialized treaty regime, but even of the law of treaties itself, as we shall come to see. These issues are now taken up in turn.
IV. Reflexes: The Individual as 'Beneficiary' and 'Duty Bearer'
Beneficiaries
The conclusion of human rights treaties in the last 60 to 70 years did not introduce any technical novelties regarding the position of the individual in international law. It was the sheer number and scope of human rights treaties that made all the difference.
On the global level, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Duty Bearers
Besides benefitting from protection that treaties afford them, individuals also bear obligations under international treaty law. The Nuremberg tribunals marked a very 60 The ILO has adopted 189 Conventions and 202 Recommendations so far. This body of work is extremely significant. 
V. The Individual as 'User'
It is mainly human rights treaties that have championed the capacity of the individual to bring international claims in its own name against a State before an international court or treaty body. As stated, the capacity to hold rights does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with the capacity to enforce these rights at the international level. This is confirmed by the fact that not all treaties which endow the individual with one type of capacity (to hold rights) also endow it with the other (to bring an international claim). However, most human rights instruments do contain a process for seeking international enforcement of the rights therein guaranteed. This process may sometimes involve recourse before an international court or tribunal, or it may also take the form a complaints process before human rights treaty bodies that do not qualify as judicial organs. protection or investor protection in human rights could indeed have a broadening effect on the content of human rights, investor rights or on the scope of environmental protection. So it could be said that the 'model' of international human rights protection is being 'rolled out' in other areas of international law, gradually transforming the individual from a mere beneficiary to an actual user of international treaty law.
In any event, the discrepancy between holding a right and having the capacity to bring an international claim regarding that right is still generally visible in international law.
Most procedures that involve individuals are controlled either by States or by interState bodies, and the outcome of complaints procedures rarely has direct effect. States remain the principal players in the enforcement game. Nevertheless, the progress achieved over the past forty years in terms of access of individuals to international justice is remarkable. Given the incremental nature of that progress, there is reason to believe that such access will continue to expand. It seems that the capacity to enforce rights will grow both in terms of substance (more rights will be internationally 'actionable') and in terms of process (more fora will be available to hear individual complaints).
Treaties, then, may create not mere benefits for individuals, but substantive rights which can be claimed on the international level. In being given the capacity to claim in its own name, the individual is upgraded from a mere 'beneficiary' to an actual 'user' of the treaty (regime), employing the treaty to achieve protection of rights at the international level. But such capacity to claim internationally is not necessary for the individual to be seen as a 'user' of treaties: the same can be said even if the treaty does not allow for claims to be brought by the individual on the international level.
First, States do not restrict the reach of international law to the international level.
They create rights and processes that individuals can directly enjoy on the domestic level. Second, individuals themselves become more assertive of their rights, again on the domestic level. This apparent evolution, however slow, uneven, or haphazard it may be, brings the individual closer to the epicenter of international law. These instruments go beyond the granting of rights to individuals. They engage them in the domestic decision-making processes as fully as possible or they provide them with access to compensation if they are victims of environmental damage. To some extent they do away with the intermediary steps that involve the presence of the State and they allow international law to be directly used by the individual. Of course it is still States that are under the obligation to provide for the framework in which these There are also subtle ways for individuals to employ treaty law as a defence.
Recently, a Greek court of First Instance was faced with a situation where number of immigrants escaped from a detention center. The conditions in the detention were truly appalling, and the immigrants were actually in fear of their health and lives. All of them were later apprehended. They were charged with the crime of 'escape' under Greek criminal law. They pleaded in defence that the conditions of their detention were so appalling as to violate a number of rights guaranteed under the ECHR. The
Court, in a striking decision, in effect accepted that ECHR rights may be entered as criminal law defences.
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Use of treaty law, and indeed use of the law of treaties, may actually occur in an even more subtle manner: the law of treaties in and of itself does not, as we saw, accord any specific capacities to the individual-at most it leaves States free to do so through the treaties they conclude. and also that the contributions to the Fund are made through the contracting parties (Article 10(1)).
102 See A Tzanakopoulos, 'Greek Court Acquits Immigrants who Escaped appalling Detaining particular 'statement' of the State, to establish that it is a reservation, and to discuss its effects on the obligation binding on the State under the relevant treaty.
VI. Beyond Users? Individuals as 'Participants'
The preceding section mapped out the ways in which the individual appears in the international legal order in relation to international treaties. The individual has the capacity to hold rights and to bear obligations and also has the capacity to bring claims, as well as to be prosecuted before international courts, tribunals, and treaty bodies. These capacities are not concurrent. They rather occur in a 'mix-and-match' This lack of cohesion regarding the place of individuals in international law leaves them either included in or excluded from the ambit of rights, obligations, and processes, depending on the particular treaty regime. States determine such inclusion or exclusion. 105 There are, however, signs that this pattern is not settled. In a number of situations, as we saw, individuals are upgraded from mere beneficiaries to users of international treaty law, and indeed so even on the domestic level. Could it be that we are now moving beyond the individual as a user, to a stage where the individual will be seen as a fully-fledged participant in international treaty law?
There have been voices in the literature that suggest that the individual should not be seen any longer as an actor that simply bears a number of capacities depending on treaty law. Roucounas has suggested that under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 106 the individual, among other actors, has become a user of that body of law.
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The existence of a -largely undefined -category of 'users of the sea' was affirmed by the ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber. In its Advisory Opinion, the SBDC stated that among the parties that can bring a claim before it are the 'users of the sea'.
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Perhaps Roucounas can be interpreted to mean that, as a 'user of the sea', the individual should become a participant in the law of the sea, at least in its treaty aspect.
Higgins has used the term 'participants in the international legal system'; in this she included individuals. 109 Higgins distanced herself from the mainstream literature claiming that the notion of "subjects" and "objects" has no credible reality, and, in my view, instances where international law is the only law governing the contract is also taken into account, it seems that the role of individuals as participants is indeed minimal.
While the individual as participant is a rather exceptional phenomenon, it signifies that the next step, the next upgrade, is possible using the traditional devices of treaty law: States may grant even more capacities to individuals, and individuals may seek to use treaties to claim or consolidate such capacities. 
VII. Conclusion: An Agenda for Research
This chapter has explored the position of the individual in the law of treaties. The first claim of the chapter is that there is no need to enter into a discussion of the concept of personality of the individual in the international legal order. It is more accurate to see the individual as endowed with different capacities: a capacity to hold rights and to enforce these rights, a capacity to bear obligations, and so forth. what is absolutely necessary (eg direct access to regional human rights courts) but they safeguard their primacy under any other aspect of international law? Or could it be that we are witnessing the first signs of wider individual participation, dictated by, among other things, the realities of a highly interconnected international legal order?
All these questions merit closer attention and analysis. They constitute an agenda for future research regarding the individual in international treaty law.
